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ABSTRACT 
The paper introduces the method of separation for improving reliability and reducing 
technical risk and provides insight into the various mechanisms through which the method of 
separation attains this goal. A comprehensive classification of techniques for improving 
reliability and reducing risk, based on the method of separation has been proposed for the 
first time. From this classification, three principal categories of separation techniques have 
been identified: (i) assuring distinct functions/properties/behaviour for distinct components or 
parts (ii) assuring distinct properties/behaviour at distinct time, value of a parameter, 
conditions or scale and (iii) distancing risk-critical factors. 
The concept ‘stochastic separation’ of random events and methods for providing a stochastic 
separation have been introduced. It is shown that separation of properties is an efficient 
technique for compensating the drawbacks associated with a selection based on homogeneous 
properties. It is also demonstrated that the method of deliberate weak links and the method of 
segmentation can be considered as a special case of the method of separation. Finally, the 
paper demonstrates that the traditional reliability measure ‘safety margin’ is misleading and 
should not be used as a measure of the relative separation between load and strength. 
 
Keywords: Generic principles, risk reduction, separation, reliability improvement; 
technical risk.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A systematic classification of generic methods for reducing technical risk is crucial to safe 
operation, engineering designs and software. However, this very important topic has not been 
covered with sufficient depth in the reliability and risk literature. For many decades, the focus 
of reliability research has been primarily on reliability prediction rather than reliability 
improvement and risk reduction. Acquiring the relevant knowledge and data related to the 
failure mechanisms and quantifying all types of uncertainty, necessary for a correct 
prediction of the time to failure is a formidable task. However, this task does not need to be 
addressed if the focus is placed on the reliability improvement and risk reduction instead of 
reliability prediction. The generic reliability improvement and risk reduction methods do not 
normally rely on reliability data or on a detailed knowledge of physical mechanisms 
underlying possible failure modes. These methods derive their strength from generic laws, 
invariants and patterns associated with increased reliability and reduced risk. As a result, 
these methods are particularly useful in developing new designs, with no failure history and 
with insufficiently researched failure mechanisms. Recent work on formulating generic 
principles and methods for improving reliability and reducing technical risk has been done in 
(Todinov, 2015). The present paper contributes to the exiting work an important generic 
reliability improvement and risk reduction method referred to as ‘the method of separation’.  
Harmful interaction of factors critical to reliability and risk is a major source of failures. 
Separation is the act of disuniting risk-critical factors. Separating risk-critical factors to 
reduce this harmful interaction is therefore a major avenue for improving reliability and 
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reducing risk. Surprisingly, the method of separation has not yet been discussed as a risk-
reduction tool. Despite that some techniques used in engineering are clearly instances of the 
method of separation, they have never been recognised as such and have never been linked 
with this method. 
Thus, deliberate weak links and stress limiters have already been used for preventing the 
stresses from reaching dangerous levels. The deliberate weak links are consciously designed 
weak points that are easily replaced (Eder, 2008) and usually protect expensive devices. As it 
will be demonstrated later, this technique is essentially an instance of a separation on a 
parameter but it has never been recognised as such and has never been linked with the 
method of separation. 
Another example can be given with the concept ‘barrier’ (Svenson, 1991; Leveson, 2011; 
Hollangel, 2016). Barriers have also been used as accident prevention tools and protection 
measure mitigating the consequences from an accident. A classification of barriers has been 
proposed (Eder and Hosnedl, 2008). Despite that barriers are also instances of separation, no 
link has ever been made with the method of separation. Barriers distancing triggers from 
hazards reduce the likelihood of an accident while barriers distancing hazards from targets 
reduce the consequences given that accident has occurred. 
It is only recently that the method of separation has been suggested in (Todinov, 2015) as 
a potential risk reduction tool but the discussion of the separation method was very limited 
and did not cover mechanisms through which separation achieves reliability improvement 
and risk reduction. Furthermore, no classification of separation techniques has been proposed. 
One of the ways to make engineering systems more efficient is to increase the 
temperature, pressure and speed of the operating fluids and reduce the cross sections of 
components to reduce weight. However, the increased temperature, pressure and speed of the 
fluids accelerate the degradation of the components while reducing the cross sections leads to 
increased stresses and stress amplitudes which increase the risk of failure due to fast fracture 
and fatigue. Similarly, increasing the efficiency of manufacturing requires increasing the 
speed of operations which leads to low precision and unreliability. 
As a result, there is a constant struggle between efficiency and reliability which is a fertile 
ground for technical contradictions. As a result, separation has been applied in the TRIZ 
methodology for inventive problem solving (Altshuller, 1984, 1996, 2007) for resolving 
physical contradictions in engineering of the type: ‘the object must have attribute A during 
one mode of use or during one stage of a particular process and the opposite attribute (not A) 
during an alternative mode of use or an alternative process stage’. An example of such type 
of separation has been introduced (Altshuller, 1984) to resolve the contradiction between the 
required attributes ‘rigid’ versus ‘not rigid’ (flexible)’. An example was given with the 
bicycle chain which is rigid on the level of a separate link and not rigid (flexible) on the 
macro level ‘chain of links’. An example of time separation used in TRIZ to ensure mutually 
exclusive attributes is frequently given with the attributes of a pile driven into the soil. It 
needs to be sharp while being driven into the soil and blunt while supporting. 
Despite that the utility of the separation principle used in TRIZ for resolving contradictory 
requirements cannot be questioned, the principle of separation introduced in TRIZ was 
primarily formulated as a way of generating inventive solutions by resolving extreme 
contradictions of the type ‘attribute A is required and attribute A is not required’. In this 
sense, the separation principle in TRIZ is understood and practiced primarily in the sense of 
separation of mutually exclusive (incompatible) attributes and not necessarily as an act of 
distancing of factors to avoid their harmful interaction. However, the act of distancing of 
interacting factors has a direct implication to reliability and risk because the unreliability and 
risk of failure are very often a direct result from a harmful interaction of reliability-critical 
factors. A well-documented example is the interference of load and strength which are often 
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associated with significant variation (Carter, 1986; Lewis, 1996). During load-strength 
interference, failure materialises when the random instance of load exceeds the random 
instance of strength. 
Furthermore, the separation in TRIZ is not oriented towards reliability improvement and 
risk reduction and no specific treatment has been provided in the TRIZ methodology related 
to the mechanisms through which the separation works in increasing reliability and reducing 
risk. No specific discussion regarding the mechanisms through which the method of 
separation increases reliability has been presented in more recent literature related to TRIZ 
(Terninko et al., 1998; Savransky, 2000; Orloff, 2006, 2012; Rantanen and Domb, 2008; 
Gadd, 2011). In addition, the separation as a problem-solving tool in TRIZ, has been 
introduced in a rather narrow context: primarily as a separation in space, time, between the 
parts and the whole and separation on a condition. However, these are not the only instances 
when separation can be performed. Separation can essentially be performed on any selected 
parameter: temperature, pressure, strength, stiffness, mass, size, etc. Separation can also be 
performed on various functions and even on the geometry of the component. The lack of 
discussion related to the mechanisms through which the different separation techniques work 
does not allow to exploit the full potential of the separation method in the area of the 
reliability improvement and risk reduction. 
More importantly, the TRIZ theory never considered ‘stochastic separation’, for which the 
separation is guaranteed only with a certain probability. TRIZ also never considered logical 
separation where no time, space, or separation on a condition is present yet the dangerous 
proximity of hazards and targets is prevented. 
In summary, no systematic analysis and classification currently exist of the fundamental 
techniques and mechanisms through which the method of separation improves reliability and 
reduces risk. To the best of our knowledge, no comprehensive work currently exists on the 
method of separation applied for reliability improvement and risk reduction and the 
classification of the various separation techniques achieving this goal.  
Consequently, this paper provides the first comprehensive introduction to the powerful 
method of separation for improving reliability and reducing risk. The mechanisms through 
which the method of separation works and the classification of separation techniques are 
discussed for the first time through various application examples.  
 
2. METHODS 
Separating risk-critical factors to reduce harmful interaction is a major avenue for 
improving reliability and reducing risk. Other major avenues for improving reliability and 
reducing risk is separating distinct functions/properties/behaviour for distinct 
components/parts and separating properties and behaviour at distinct time, scale or 
conditions. The method of separation presented in this paper is based on a large number of 
available solutions improving reliability and reducing risk in various engineering fields. They 
achieve reliability improvement and risk reduction through one of the three distinct avenues 
discussed earlier. Each of the available solutions was analysed to verify and, in some cases to 
quantify, its effect on the reliability improvement and risk reduction. 
The available solutions were also analysed for recurring patterns and invariants. A certain 
level of abstraction was used to strip the observations in different engineering fields from 
their specific engineering context in order to uncover the underlying act of separation. This 
approach helped uncover hidden patterns and reach conclusions. Such was for example the 
conclusion that introducing deliberate weak links to reduce risk is essentially an act of 
separation. 
From the large body of observations, patterns and invariants emerged which were captured 
and separated into distinct categories, classes and individual techniques. This is essentially a 
4 
 
process of distillation of generic principles and techniques for improving reliability and 
reducing risk achieved by separation. A classification summarising these categories, classes 
and techniques has been presented in Fig.1. From this classification, three principal 
categories of separation techniques have been identified: (i) techniques assuring distinct 
functions/properties/behaviour for distinct components/parts (ii) techniques assuring distinct 
properties/behaviour at distinct time, value of a parameter, conditions or scale and (iii) 
techniques involving distancing risk-critical factors.  
 
Figure 1. Classifications of various techniques for improving reliability and reducing risk by separation. 
 
In what follows, each category of separation techniques is discussed in detail. 
 
3. SEPARATION ASSURING DISTINCT PROPERTIES/BEHAVIOUR 
AT DISTINCT VALUES OF A PARAMETER, AT DISTINCT TIMES, 
AT DISTINCT CONDITIONS OR SCALE 
Reducing risk by a separation on a risk-critical parameter is present when different 
characteristics of an object at different values of a risk-critical parameter are ensured to 
reduce the likelihood of failure or the consequences given that failure has occurred. 
Separation of properties is an efficient method countering the drawbacks associated with 
average properties. The separation of properties essentially ‘assures’ distinct properties to 
different parts so that the overall risk of failure is reduced.  
 
3.1 Separation of stress and strength (mechanical stress, current, voltage, pressure, etc.) 
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3.1.1 Critical weaknesses of the traditional reliability measures 'safety margin' and ‘loading 
roughness’ as measures of the degree of separation between load and strength. 
 
The loading stress is a risk-critical parameter. In many cases, the reliability on demand is 
determined by the probability of a relative configuration of the load and strength, in which 
load is smaller than strength. Reliability on demand is controlled by the two risk-critical 
parameters ‘load’ and ‘strength’, characterised by distinct distributions.  
Load and strength are much broader concepts than their mechanical interpretation. Any 
two interacting random parameters can be interpreted as 'load' and 'strength'. Load and 
strength, for example, could stand for ‘demand’ and ‘supply’, ‘rate of damage’ and ‘rate of 
recovery’, ‘corrosion rate’ and ‘corrosion resistance’, ‘stress intensity’ and ‘fracture 
toughness’, etc. 
In a load-strength interaction, risk is strongly dependent on the degree of relative 
separation of the load variation and strength variation.  
Consider a load distribution characterised by a mean L  and standard deviation L  and 
strength distribution characterised by a mean S  and standard deviation S . A common 
measure quantifying the degree of relative separation of the load and strength is the reliability 
index, defined as 
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where )(  is the cumulative distribution of the standard normal distribution (O’Connor 
2002, Carter 1986, 1997). 
From equation (2), it is easy to see that a larger difference LS    between the means of 
the strength and load distribution and smaller variances 2L  and 
2
S  of the load and strength 
distributions, lead to a larger reliability index   and larger reliability on demand. The safety 
margin has been used as a measure for the relative separation of the load and strength 
distribution even for load and strength distributions which do not follow the Gaussian 
distribution (O’Connor 2002). 
In what follows, it is demonstrated that for load and strength that do not follow the normal 
distribution, the traditional reliability measure safety margin is misleading and cannot be used 
to measure the degree of relative separation between load and strength. 
Consider the load and strength distributions from Fig.2a. The figure shows a case where a 
low safety margin 22/)( LSLS    exists ( LS    is small and 
22
LS    is large) 
yet the reliability on demand is high. In Fig.2a, S  and L  are the mean values of the 
strength and load; S  and L  are the corresponding standard deviations. Now consider 
Fig.2b which has been obtained by reflecting symmetrically the distributions from Fig.2a 
with respect to axes 1r  and 2r , parallel to the probability density axis. Since the reflections do 
not change the variances of the distributions, the only difference is the larger difference of the 
means LSLS  
''  (Fig.2b). Despite the larger new safety margin 
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the reliability on demand related to the load-strength configuration in Fig.2b is smaller than 
the reliability related to the configuration in Fig.2a. Clearly, the safety margin concept 
applied without considering the shape of the interacting distribution tails can be very 
misleading. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  A counterexample showing that for skewed load and strength distribution, the traditional reliability 
measures 'reliability index' is very misleading. 
 
Similar considerations are valid regarding the parameter loading roughness 22/ SLL    
introduced in (Carter, 1986, 1997). If only the load in Fig.2a is reflected symmetrically with 
respect to axis 1r , the loading in Fig.2c is obtained. Since the standard deviation L  of the 
load has not been affected by the reflection, the loading roughness in Fig.2c, calculated from 
22/ SLL   , is the same as in Fig.2a, despite the much more severe type of loading. 
 
3.1.2 Interaction between the upper tail of the load distribution and the lower tail of the 
strength distribution. 
The problems outlined in the previous section do not exist if for load and strength which 
do not follow a normal distribution, a numerical integration is used to quantify the relative 
separation between load and strength. The most important aspect of the load-strength 
interaction is the interaction of the upper tail of the load distribution and the lower tail of the 
strength distribution (Fig.3). Consequently, only information related to the lower tail of the 
strength distribution and the upper tail of the load distribution is necessary.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Reliability is determined by the interaction of the upper tail of the load distribution and the lower tail 
of the strength distribution. 
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The values from the lower tail of the strength distribution and the upper tail of the load 
distribution control reliability, not the values corresponding to the other parts of the 
distributions (Fig.3). 
Consequently, an adequate model of the strength distribution should faithfully represent its 
lower tail and an adequate model of the load distribution should faithfully represent its upper 
tail.  
The interaction of the upper tail of the load distribution and the lower tail of the strength 
distribution can be quantified. Consider the load-strength integral (Lewis, 1996) which gives 
the probability of failure fp  for a single load application: 
 
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where )(xFL  is the cumulative distribution of the load and )(xfS  is the probability density 
distribution of the strength. 
Suppose that the minS  and maxS  in Fig.4 correspond to stress levels for which 0)( xfS  if 
minSx   or maxSx  . 
 
 
Figure 4. Deriving the reliability on demand, by integrating within the interval (Smin, Lmax) including only the 
upper tail of the load distribution and the lower tail of the strength distribution. 
 
The integral in Equation (3) can also be presented as 
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For maxLx  , 1)( xFL  holds for the cumulative distribution of the load (Fig.4) and the 
second integral in Equation (4) becomes zero ( 0)()](1[
max
max

S
L
SL dxxfxF ). Consequently, 
the probability of failure becomes 
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Finally, for the reliability on demand, we get 
 
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The reliability integral (6) which quantifies the relative separation of the load distribution 
and the strength distribution has a clear advantage: To quantify the separation of the load and 
strength, data covering the lower tail of the load distribution and the upper tail of the strength 
distribution are no longer necessary. 
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The variance of the load distribution or the strength distribution can be reduced by 
shortening the lower tail of the load distribution without altering its upper tail and by 
reducing the upper tail of the strength distribution without altering its lower tail. However, 
the result from equation (6) shows that reducing the standard deviation of the load 
distribution and the strength distribution in the described fashion will have no impact on the 
risk of failure. Consequently, reducing the variances of the interacting random factors does 
not necessarily increase their relative separation and reduce risk. 
Separation of the load distribution and the strength distribution can for example, be done 
by focusing on the strength distribution only (Fig.5c). The well-known burn-in operation 
(O’Connor, 2002) essentially increases the relative separation of the lower tail of the strength 
distribution and the load distribution thereby reducing the load-strength interference and 
reducing the risk of failure.  
The relative separation of the load distribution and the strength distribution can also be 
increased by introducing deliberate weak links or stress limiters. 
 
3.2 Separation by designing deliberate weak links 
The consequences from failure and the risk of failure can be decreased if potential failures 
are channelled into deliberately designed weak links. Should the unfavourable conditions 
occur, the weak links are the ones to fail and protect the structure or component. In this way, 
the conditional losses are limited. 
In case of M mutually exclusive failure modes, the expected conditional loss fC  (given 
that failure has occurred) is given by 
fMfMfffff CpCpCpC |||2|2|1|1 ...                                       (7) 
where fkC |  is the expected conditional loss associated with the k-th failure mode 
(k=1,2,…,M) and fkp |  is the conditional probability that given failure, it is the k-th failure 
mode that has initiated it ( 1
1
| 

M
k
fkp ). Indeed, the loss from failure fC  can take its values in 
M distinct, mutually exclusive ways: if the first failure mode materializes and the loss of 
failure is equal to the loss of failure fC |1  associated with the first failure mode; if the second 
failure mode materializes and the loss of failure is equal to the loss of failure fC |2  associated 
with the second failure mode;...;and finally, if the Mth failure mode materializes and the loss 
of failure is equal to the loss of failure fMC |  associated with the Mth failure mode. 
Considering the conditional probabilities fkp |  (k=1,2,…,M) associated with the failure 
modes (given that failure has occurred) and applying the total probability theorem yields 
equation (7). For M failure modes characterised by constant failure rates 1 , 2 ,..., M , it can 
be shown that the conditional probabilities fkp |  are given by 
M
k
fkp




...21
| , Mk ,...,2,1                                        (8) 
Without restricting generality, suppose that a deliberate weak link has been designed and 
fMC |1  is the conditional loss associated with the failure of the deliberate weak link. The loss 
fMC |1  is the smallest among all conditional losses fkC | , ( fkfM CC ||1  , k=1,2,…,M). 
Suppose that the conditional probability fMp |1  of the deliberately built weak link has been 
made to be significantly larger than any other conditional probability ( fkfM pp ||1  , 
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k=1,2,…,M). Given failure, it is now highly likely that the deliberate weak link has caused it 
(failure mode M+1, associated with the smallest conditional losses fMC |1 ). As a result, it is 
highly likely that the conditional loss fC  given failure will be equal to the conditional loss of 
the deliberate weak link and the consequences of failure will be limited. 
The deliberately introduced weak links essentially separate expensive components/systems 
from excessive loading stress. If the loading stress increases to a particular value *p  of the 
parameter (Fig.5a), a deliberate weak link fails and prevents a further increase of the loading 
stress (Fig.5a) on the component/system. As a result, components/systems are protected from 
overloading.  
 
Figure 5. a) Separation of the load and strength by including a deliberate weak link; b) separation of the load 
and strength by a stress limiter; c) separation of the load and strength by a burn-in operation. 
 
A shear pin in a mechanical coupling, for example, transmits torque up to a specified level 
*p , beyond which the shear pin fails and disconnects the driving shaft from the mechanical 
device (Fig.5a). The shear pin acts as a deliberate weak link. As a result, the critical torque 
resistance of the mechanical device cannot be reached and the mechanical device is separated 
from overload. Rupture discs on pressure vessels and blow out panels built in buildings are 
typical examples of deliberate weak links.  They are sacrificial components which separate 
from excessive pressure.  
Electric fuses are also a common example of deliberate weak links separating electronic 
circuits from excessive levels of current. 
Crash cones used in race cars separate against excessive deceleration during impact by 
deforming during an impact thereby increasing the time t  during which the deceleration 
force F is present. For a given change vm  in the moment of the impacting car (m is the 
mass of the car and v  is the change of its velocity) from the well-known relationship 
vmtF  , an increase of the impact (deceleration) time t  results in a proportional 
reduction of the magnitude F of the average impact force. 
Sacrificial anodes can also be considered to be deliberate weak links separating 
components (underground pipes, underwater installations, ship hulls) from excessive 
corrosion. 
Deliberate weak links can also separate against excessive wear. For example, cheap rubber 
segments bolted on top of a conveyor act as deliberate weak links. They take all the excessive 
wear and their failure is followed by a replacement of a cheap rubber segment rather than by 
a replacement of an expensive conveyor belt. 
In separating from excessive levels of the loading stress, the stress limiters can also be 
considered as instances of deliberate weak links (Fig.5b). A common example of a stress 
limiter is the anti-surge protector preventing voltage from reaching dangerous levels that 
could damage the electronic equipment. The safety pressure valve, activated when pressure 
reaches a critical level, is another common example of a stress limiter separating the loading 
stress from the strength of the material (Fig.5b). 
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While deliberate weak links are designed to fail and separate from excessive loading 
stress, stress limiters separate from excessive loading stress without suffering failure. The 
specially designed shoulder on the screw in Figure 6 is an example of a stress limiter. The 
shoulder prevents over-tightening of the screw and damaging the plastic component. The 
magnitude of the loading stress on the plastic part has been limited without any failure 
occurrence. 
 
Figure 6. An example of a stress limiter: eliminating the risk of damaging the plastic part by a special design of 
the screw. 
 
The friction clutches is another example of a stress limiter, that has been specifically 
designed to slip during a torque overload. The friction clutch acts as a deliberate weak link 
which does not suffer failure.  
Expansion offsets are a common generic solution for separating from excessive temperature 
and developing excessive thermal stresses by accommodating thermal expansion/contraction. 
The shape and the size of the offsets depend on the amount of thermal expansion/contraction 
that needs to be accommodated. 
In summary, the considered deliberate weak links can be classified as components/devices 
separating from excessive levels of: (i) torque, (ii) shear, (iii) tension, (iv) compression, (v) 
pressure, (vi) current, (vii) deceleration, (viii) temperature and (ix) wear. 
 
3.3 Separation on loading stresses 
Separation on loading stresses is present in cases where the design has been made in such a 
way that part of the structural elements are experiencing only tensile loading stresses while 
the rest of the components are experiencing only compressive stresses. Such loading, for 
example, is present in trusses, where the members experience only tension or compression. 
Bending and shear are completely eliminated from the truss structures. Eliminating bending 
and separating the loading stresses into tensile and compressive only, provides the possibility 
to reduce the cross sections of the tensile elements and reduce the weight of the design 
without compromising reliability. The cross sections of the tensile elements can be reduced 
because the buckling failure mode is absent for tensile elements. At the same time, for the 
same weight, a separation on loading stresses results in enhanced reliability. 
Tensegrity systems (Wang, 2004) are composite forms of structures where a set of 
discontinuous compression components interacts with a set of continuous tensile components 
to define a stable space structure. Tensegrity systems are a good example of separation on 
loading stresses where most of the components are loaded in tension and only few 
components experience compression. The cross sections of the components experiencing 
tension can be reduced which results in an overall reduction of the weight of the structure or 
in an increased load-carrying capacity at a specified weight. 
 
3.4 Separation on temperature 
Temperature is a common risk-critical parameter. A typical example of separation on 
temperature is present in thermostats switching on and off heating circuits when temperature 
reaches a critical level. 
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Separation on operating temperature is also present when the aggregate state of the 
material is changed deliberately to reduce the hazard potential and risk. Thus, freezing a 
volatile and flammable substance during transportation eliminates the risk of spillage and 
explosion during a road accident. 
Materials selection can also be made to provide a separation on temperature. During 
induction heating of a steel part for example, overheating beyond the Curie temperature crT  
of the steel, from which the part is made, is impossible. At a temperature crT , from 
ferromagnetic (temperatures crTT  ), the steel becomes diamagnetic (temperatures crTT  ). 
Because the magnetic properties of the steel change at crTT  , induction heating of the steel 
beyond crTT   is no longer possible therefore overheating beyond crTT   is not possible. 
Separation on operating temperature has been used to protect control equipment in rockets 
from overheating. Rockets are placed in a foam shell which evaporates after the rocket 
launching. 
Separation on operating temperature is present in thermistors which are essentially 
resistors whose resistance changes significantly with changing temperature. In thermistors 
with negative temperature coefficient (NTC thermistors) the resistance coefficient decreases 
significantly with increasing temperature. This has important applications with protective 
devices (e.g. cooling fans, protective circuits) which are activated when temperature increases 
to dangerous levels. 
 
3.4.1 Separation on temperature to achieve compressive residual stress at the surface 
Separation on temperature can be used to achieve a particular state characterised by increased 
reliability. For example, compressive residual stresses after quenching of cylindrical rods is 
beneficial for the fatigue resistance because of the crack closure effect of the compressive 
stress field. To achieve compressive residual stresses at the surface for steel cylindrical rods, 
separation on temperature can be used which results in a different behaviour of the quenching 
medium. 
During quenching of a steel rod there are two counteracting principal factors controlling 
the formation of the residual stress at the surface (Todinov, 1999). The first factor is the 
thermal strain formed during the thermal contraction of the quenched rods which results in a 
compressive residual stress at the surface. The second factor is the thermal strain formed 
during the martensitic phase transformation at low temperatures which results in the 
formation of tensile residual stresses at the surface. If during quenching of a cylindrical steel 
specimen, the net plastic strain generated in the thermal contraction region is greater than that 
generated in the transformation region, the residual stress at surface is compressive and vice 
versa. This conclusion is supported by the continuum model proposed in (Todinov, 1998) and 
the experiments presented in (Todinov, 1999). 
 Consequently, the initial phase of quenching starting from high temperatures should be 
conducted in a quench medium characterised by a high heat transfer coefficient. This will 
create large thermal plastic strains which will result in large compressive residual stresses at 
the surface. At low temperatures, the quenching medium should be characterised by a low 
heat transfer coefficient. This will create small thermal gradients in the martensitic 
temperature interval and the transformation plastic strains which promote tensile residual 
stresses at the surface will be minimal. The result will be compressive residual stresses at the 
surface. 
A separation on temperature can also be achieved by quenching sequentially in two 
separate quench media. The component is initially quenched in the first quench medium, 
characterised by a high heat transfer coefficient at high temperatures, for creating large 
thermal strains. Subsequently, the component is transferred in a second quench medium, 
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characterized by a low heat transfer coefficient in the martensitic transformation region, to 
reduce the thermal gradients and achieve small plastic strains. The heat-treatment process 
will result in compressive stresses at the surface (Todinov, 1999). 
 
3.5 Separation on size 
A common separation on size is present in strainers whose function is to stop debris from 
entering a system. The strainer separates on the parameter ‘size’ because it retains debris 
beyond a critical size capable of clogging the system whilst letting through debris with a 
smaller size. The size of the debris is a risk-critical parameter because clogging of a filter by 
debris for example, results in a low pressure after the filter, which normally constitutes 
failure.  
 
4. SEPARATION ASSURING DISTINCT FUNCTIONS, PROPERTIES 
OR BEHAVIOUR FOR DISTINCT COMPONENTS/PARTS 
 
4.1 Separation of functions  
4.1.1 Separation of functions to reduce vulnerability to a single failure 
Separation of functions consists of assigning different functions to different parts of a 
component/system. 
In general, it is difficult to optimise a single component carrying many functions with 
regard to every single function. Separating critical functions to different parts/components is 
often the key to improving reliability and reducing risk. 
The separation of functions will be illustrated with the design of flexible pipes carrying 
hydrocarbons (Fig.7) under water. 
1
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Figure 7.  Separation of functions in a flexible pipe transporting hydrocarbons under water. 
 
The pipe is composed of a stainless steel internal carcass (1); an internal sheath (2) which 
is extruded polymer barrier; a pressure armour (3) – a carbon-steel interlocked 
circumferential layer and a tensile armour (4) – helically wound carbon-steel layers for axial 
strength. Externally, the pipe is protected by extruded sheath (5). The internal carcass (1) 
prevents collapse of the internal sheath (2) due to the hydrostatic pressure of the water and 
also ensures mechanical protection. The internal sheath (2) ensures the integrity of the 
transported fluid while the function of the pressure armour and the tensile armour is to 
provide resistance against radial and tensile loads. The external sheath (5) is a mechanical 
barrier shielding the pipe’s internal structural elements from the marine environment.  
As a result, the different parts of the flexible pipe carry different functions: to protect 
against external corrosion, to resist tensile loads, to resist radial loads resulting from internal 
pressure, to make the pipe leak-proof and to prevent collapse due to external pressure. It is 
difficult to optimise a homogeneous pipe with respect to each of these functions. The 
separation of functions to different parts permits the optimisation of each part with respect to 
the single function it carries. The result is increased overall reliability of the pipe.  
Seemingly, the separation of functions among separate parts contradicts the principle of 
improving reliability by reducing the number of parts. Indeed, the separation of functions 
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works towards increasing the complexity of the system instead of reducing it. This apparent 
contradiction can be resolved by considering that a loss of a part carrying a separate function 
does not mean a loss of all system functions. Furthermore, the separation of functions to 
different parts decreases the vulnerability of the component/system because the parts with the 
separated functions often provide k-out-of-n redundancy (Ramakumar, 1993) and the system 
is operational if k parts carrying separate functions are lost. 
This particular property of the separation of functions can be illustrated particularly well 
by the case where the same function has been separated to multiple components to reduce 
risk, which is essentially a process of segmentation. Segmentation is the act of separating an 
entity (assembly, system, process, task, time, etc.) into a number of distinct parts. In this 
respect, the method of segmentation used for risk reduction introduced in (Todinov, 2015) 
can be interpreted as a special case of separation where the same function has been separated 
into different parts. 
By separating a function into separate parts carrying the same function, separation replaces 
a single critical failure occurring at a macro-level with non-critical failures occurring at a 
micro-level. Suppose that a single resource is used for servicing a critical manufacturing 
process. Failure of the resource entails an interruption of the manufacturing process and 
causes severe delays and lost production. If the resource is separated into multiple smaller 
resources, failure of a single resource will not be catastrophic and will not entail a shutdown 
of the manufacturing process. Separation reduced risk by replacing a single critical failure 
with non-critical failures.  
Analytical justification of this technique will be given with a single bolt used for fixing a 
critical part. Suppose that the only failure mode is ‘manufacturing defect in the bolt causing a 
fast fatigue failure’ and the reliability of the bolt, associated with one year of continuous 
operation, is 75.0r . Suppose that the function of the bolt has been separated into four 
smaller bolts made of the same material as the initial single bolt and suffering the same 
failure mode. The four bolts give the same total clamping force as the single bolt and each of 
the bolts is characterised by a lower reliability 70.0s , associated with the operational time 
interval of one year. Any two of the smaller bolts are sufficient to perform the function of 
fixing reliably the critical part.  
The probability that the separated bolt assembly will survive 1 year of continuous 
operation without failure to support the critical part is now equal to the probability that at 
least two (two, three or all four) bolts will survive the operational interval of one year. If the 
bolts fail independently from one another, this probability is given by 
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As a result of the separation, the reliability of the segmented bolt assembly increased 
significantly compared to the single bolt, despite that the reliability of each of the smaller 
bolts was inferior to the reliability of the single initial bolt. 
The separation of a single function greatly enhances the reliability of devices obtaining a 
signal from a sensor and triggering a particular action/alarm if the signal indicates a 
dangerous concentration of a particular chemical, dangerous magnitude of a force, torque, 
pressure, temperature, humidity, etc. Separation of a single sensor into multiple sensors, even 
with inferior reliability, makes the system less vulnerable to a single malfunction of a sensor 
or even to simultaneous failures of several sensors. Separation of a function into smaller-size 
components carrying the same function also reduces inertia forces and the response of the 
device to driving forces of small magnitudes. This is used in twin turbochargers where, to 
improve the response of the turbine to exhaust gases with small energy, two smaller 
turbochargers are used instead of a single large turbocharger. 
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Suppose that a component is responsible for three functions. Failure of the component will 
then cause a loss of all three functions. If functions are assigned to different components such 
that each component performs a single function, the loss of a component will cause a loss of a 
single function only. Furthermore, separating the functions performed by a single component 
relieves the stress on the component. Sensitivity to a single component failure is often present 
in cases where a particular component is overloaded with too many functions and demands. 
The component is ‘over-stretched’ and its strength can be easily exceeded if combined 
multiple demands are present. Additional functions required from a component also increase 
the number of different failure modes of the component. With increasing the number of 
failure modes, the overall hazard rate increases and the reliability decreases. 
A common design error of this type, which has caused high-impact failures is combining 
the critical functions of load carrying and sealing in the design of a joint. Such was the case 
with the space shuttle Challenger booster’s O-ring, which was simultaneously sealing the 
section of the assembly and taking the pressure of combustion (Ullman, 2003). 
Separation of functions can reduce risk even in the case where the parts carrying the 
separate functions are logically arranged in series. Indeed, if 1 , 2 ,..., n  are the hazard rates 
characterising the different failure modes (tensile failure mode, torsion failure mode, 
buckling, leaking, etc.), the reliability 0R  of a component for which the functions have not 
been separated is: 
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separation of functions to distinct parts provides the opportunity to optimise each 
corresponding part (carrying a separate function) against the failure mode it resists. As a 
consequence, after the separation of functions, the hazard rates '1 , 
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1 expexp  . As a result, given that no 
new failure modes are introduced, by separating the functions into separate parts logically 
arranged in series, despite the increase in the number of parts, the risk of failure is usually 
decreased because of the possibility for an optimization. 
 
4.1.2 Separation of functions for a mutual compensation of deficiencies 
The separation of functions can be provided for mutual compensation of deficiencies 
associated with the different components building a system. A typical example is the hybrid 
joint, combining an adhesive joint and mechanical fixing. There is a clear separation of 
functions: the adhesive part reduces the stress concentration along the joint while the 
mechanical fixing increases the peel resistance of the adhesive joint and its stiffness. 
Separation of functions is often present in the design of complex alloys where some of the 
microstructural constituents provide wear resistance, while other constituents provide 
toughness (resistance to crack propagation). 
Reinforced concrete used in the construction industry is a good example of separation of 
functions. Concrete is a material with good compressive strength but small tensile strength. 
Accordingly, the concrete is reinforced with steel bars placed in areas loaded in tension 
where the concrete cannot resist tensile stresses. 
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4.1.3 Separation of functions to satisfy conflicting requirements 
Mixture of several structural constituents carrying different functions can be used to create 
components satisfying conflicting requirements. Thus, to reduce the risk of injury to divers, 
the water must be dense to provide buoyancy and must not be dense to cushion the impact 
and prevent injury. This is achieved with water saturated with air bubbles. The water provides 
the necessary buoyancy while the air bubbles soften the water by decreasing the water density 
thereby mitigating the consequences from an impact.  
 
4.1.4 Separation of functions to prevent unwanted interactions 
Separation of functions (also known as ‘separation of concerns’) is a well-known principle 
of design of computer programs (Reade, 1989). A concern is a relatively simple, self-
contained task, addressed by a programme section. Separation of functions in programming is 
achieved by encapsulating data and statements inside a section of code that has a well-defined 
interface. This results into a modular programme, consisting of procedures and functions. The 
encapsulation means that the variables defined into the encapsulated module (procedure or a 
function) remain only visible within the module and can be altered only within the module. 
Encapsulation avoids unwanted interactions between different pieces of code in the same 
programme. Avoiding unwanted interactions avoids the possibility of side effects and 
difficult to rectify bugs if a variable from a particular section of code is altered from another 
section of code. Furthermore, the encapsulated sections of code can be updated and tested 
independently, without having to alter code in the rest of the sections, which significantly 
decreases the possibility of introducing bugs. The encapsulated piece of code is essentially a 
black box with specified input and output, whose content can be independently developed 
and replaced without affecting the logic of the programme. 
 
4.2 Separation of properties to counter the drawbacks associated with average 
properties  
Separation of properties is necessary when the average property characterising a 
homogeneous state cannot provide the required reliability.  
Consider a loaded steel component working in aggressive environment. Suppose that a 
compromise has been made by striking balance between the corrosion resistance of the steel 
and its cost. The result is a component which still corrodes but at a smaller rate. Instead, the 
surface in contact with the aggressive environment could be coated with a small quantity anti-
corrosion coating with a very high corrosion resistance. To offset the overall cost, cheap 
steel, with a small corrosion resistance, can be selected for the rest of the steel part. As a 
result, the overall corrosion resistance is significantly increased, with little or no increase of 
the overall cost of the component. 
This method works also in selecting materials to resist loading stresses. Selecting a 
homogeneous material with average value of the strength (resistance) cannot provide a 
sufficient resistance in the high-stress zones while in low-stress zones, the strength is 
insufficient to resist the load (Fig.8c). Consider the bracket in Fig.8a resisting a high-
magnitude occasional overload with magnitude maxF . The material of zone A must resist large 
tensile stresses while the material of zone B does not experience stresses of large magnitude. 
Commonly, the entire bracket is made of homogeneous steel, striking a compromise between 
tensile strength and cost.  Instead, zone A which experiences high tensile stresses, could be 
made of expensive steel with high tensile strength. Zone B could be made of cheap steel, with 
low tensile strength, and the two parts could be joined to form the bracket. As a result, the 
reliability of the bracket will be increased significantly with a small or no increase of the cost. 
If the loading stress varies in the volume of the component, selecting a homogeneous material 
with average resistance cannot guarantee that the resistance curve will always be greater than 
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the curve representing the load (Fig.8c). The separation of properties guarantees that the 
resistance will be greater than the load and the required reliability will be guaranteed (Fig.8c). 
Offsetting the drawbacks of a homogeneous state by a separation of properties is very useful 
in cases where reliability is balanced against weight and cost. Improving reliability only 
locally, where it matters, saves resources and results in lightweight designs. 
 
               
Figure 8. a,b) Separation of properties in a loaded bracket; c) Separation of the properties guarantees that the 
resistance will be greater than the load. 
 
Separation of properties can be used to create a component/system satisfying conflicting 
requirements. Guaranteeing different properties at different places is the underlying principle 
behind coatings improving the wear resistance and corrosion resistance of surfaces subjected 
to wear and contact with aggressive environments.  
This principle is often used in composite materials, combining structural constituents with 
different properties in different directions. 
Consider a rod subjected to a combination of tension shock loading and intensive wear. 
The rod must be hard in order to resist the wear and at the same time it must be tough to resist 
the stress from the shock loading. In a compromise, with no separation of properties, a 
homogeneous material will be selected which has a satisfactory hardness to resist wear and a 
satisfactory toughness to resist shock loading. The result is an inferior solution which is 
neither optimised against wear nor against shock loading. These contradicting requirements 
can be simultaneously guaranteed if a separation of properties is implemented.  
Consider a process of gas nitriding which saturates the surface layers of steel components 
with nitrides. The nitride coating is brittle and provides no resistance against the stresses from 
shock loading. However, the nitride coating is hard and can successfully resist wear. At the 
same time, gas nitriding provides resistance against fatigue, because it creates compressive 
residual stresses inducing crack closure and reducing the rate of fatigue crack propagation. 
The inner parts of the rod are not subjected to wear. Consequently, no special wear-resistant 
properties for these parts are necessary. These parts must remain tough to resist shock 
loading. A clear separation of properties is present, which provides the best service 
conditions for both - the surface and the inner parts of the rod. 
In a related example, a gear must be hard, to endure large contact stresses and intensive 
wear and soft, to endure impacts. These conflicting requirements require conflicting material 
properties: the surface of the gear must be hard while the core must be soft. These conflicting 
properties can be guaranteed by the separation of properties achieved through case hardening 
(Kalpakjian and Schmid, 2001). This consists of a local induction heating of the surface 
layers followed by quenching. Case hardening improves the resistance of the surface to large 
contact stresses and wear, while leaving the core tough makes it resistant against impact 
loads.  
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In another example of separation of properties, imparting different resonance frequencies 
to connected components in a vibrating system dampens the amplitude of vibrations of the 
system and prolongs its life. 
 
5. IMPROVING RELIABILITY AND REDUCING RISK BY 
DISTANCING RISK-CRITICAL FACTORS 
 
5.1 Distancing risk-critical factors by a stochastic separation  
Stochastic separation is present if minimal distances between risk-critical events is 
guaranteed with a specified probability.  
Risk often depends on the non-overlapping of random events in a time interval. The 
competition of random demands for a particular resource/service on a finite time interval is a 
common example of risk and reliability controlled by the simultaneous presence of critical 
events. The appearance of a critical event engages the servicing resources and if a new 
critical event occurs during the service time of the first critical event, no servicing resources 
will be available for the second event.  
Suppose that only a single repair resource is available for servicing failures on a power 
line. In the case of a power line failure, the repair resource will be engaged and if another 
failure occurs during the repair time associated with the first failure, no free repair resource 
will be available for recovering the power distribution system from the last failure. The delay 
in the second repair could lead to overloading of the power distribution system thereby 
inducing further failures. 
There are cases where a very low probability of simultaneous presence of risk-critical 
critical events can be tolerated. Such is for example, the case of breakdowns of heating 
elements attached to different sections of a long subsea oil pipeline. Each failed heating 
element demands the intervention of a special repair vessel. If an intervention vessel is 
available and a breakdown of a heating element occurs, the repair vessel is engaged in the 
repair of the failed heating element. If during the repair, another breakdown of a heating 
element occurs, no free repair vessel will be available to service the new failure. As a result, 
the delay in recovering from the second failure will result in the formation of waxy deposits 
in the affected pipeline section which could block the flow through the pipeline. Blocking the 
flow by waxy deposits entails lengthy and expensive intervention involving cutting and 
replacing large sections of the pipeline. 
Another category of failures controlled by the simultaneous presence of critical events is 
present when the simultaneous appearance of critical events increases the load on the system 
to a level which exceeds the system’s strength. Commonly, the simultaneous appearance of 
random demands whose number is greater than the capacity of the system leads to 
overloading which often has catastrophic consequences for the system. 
Yet another category of failures controlled by the simultaneous presence of risk-critical 
events relates to the case where some of the critical events weaken/degrade the system’s 
strength while some of the events increase the load on the system. Thus, the simultaneous 
presence of the critical event ‘repair of a failed power line’ and the critical event ‘sudden 
increase in power consumption’ often cause overloading and failure of other power lines and 
disruption of the power supply. 
A very low probability of a simultaneous presence of random demands can be tolerated for 
example, in a situation where critically injured people demand a particular piece of life-
saving equipment.  
Suppose that the times of the risk-critical events follow a homogeneous Poisson process in 
the interval (0,L) and each event has a duration ‘s’. In other words, the number of events in 
the time interval is a random variable. According to an equation discussed in (Todinov, 
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2005), the probability 0p  that there will be no clustering of two or more random events 
within a critical distance s is 
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where r denotes the maximum number of time gaps of length s, which can be accommodated 
into the finite time interval with length L ( 1]/[  sLr  ), where  is the greatest integer 
which does not exceed the ratio L/s). 
Consider the important practical problem of requests arriving randomly in time to a source 
that can service only a single request at a time. Assume for the sake of simplicity that time s 
is needed to service each random request. The random requests could be related to using 
unique piece of equipment, using a particular resource (e.g. water vapour, electrical power, 
compressed air, etc.). The list can be continued. 
Equation (9) can be used for setting reliability requirements to provide a stochastic time 
separation (avoiding overlapping of events) of duration at least s, with high probability, in the 
common case where the random events follow a homogeneous Poisson process. For any 
specified time of demand s and a minimum probability 0p  with which the separation 
intervals of length at least s must exist, solving the equation with respect to   yields an upper 
bound *  (an envelope) for the number density of the random events. The envelope 
guarantees with a minimum probability 0p  that whenever for the number density   of 
events, *   is fulfilled, the specified minimum separation of a distance at least s will exist 
between successive random demands,. In other words, with the specified probability 0p , 
there will be no unsatisfied demand. 
In an illustrative example, the number density envelope of random demands will be 
determined which guarantees that the probability of unsatisfied demand will be below a 
specified level. A single source servicing random requests is available and each random 
request requires a minimum time interval of 0.5h to be serviced. The demands follow a 
homogeneous Poisson process in a finite time interval of 100h. If two or more demands 
follow within the critical service time interval of 0.5h, there will be unsatisfied demand. The 
maximum acceptable probability of unsatisfied demand has been specified to be 1.0cp . 
By solving equation (9) with respect to  , where 9.010  cpp , the upper bound  
0467.0*  h-1 of the number density of demands can be obtained. Whenever for the number 
density   of demands 0467.0*    h-1 is fulfilled, the probability of unsatisfied demand 
is smaller than 0.1. Monte Carlo simulations (one million trials) of a homogeneous Poisson 
process with density 0467.0*   yielded 0.1 for the probability of clustering two or more 
random demands within the critical interval of 0.5 h, which confirms the result from solving 
equation (9). Thus, for an expected number of 5 demands in 100h, the probability of 
unsatisfied demand is substantial ( 0.1). Even for the mean number density of 2 demands in 
100h, the calculation from equation (9) shows that there is still approximately 2% chance of 
unsatisfied demand.  
Figure 9 gives the dependence of the probability of unsatisfied demand for a single source 
and time of 1s h for servicing a single random demand. The operating time interval is 
100a h. The probability of unsatisfied demand has been plotted for different values of the 
number density of the random demands. 
For a mean number of 14 demands per 100h, there is already 80% probability of unsatisfied 
demand. Clearly, the probability of unsatisfied demand is substantial and should always be 
taken into consideration in risk assessments. 
]/[ sL
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Figure 9. Probability of unsatisfied demand on a finite operational time interval of 100h. The random demands 
follow a homogeneous Poisson process and each random demand requires 1h service time. 
 
Plots similar to the one in Figure 9 can be used for setting reliability requirements which 
provide the required degree of stochastic separation. For a specified maximum acceptable 
probability of unsatisfied demand, for example 14%, the number density envelope of 
04.0*   1h  can be determined (see the arrows in Figure 9). This envelope guarantees that 
whenever the number density of the demands does not exceed 04.0*   ( *  ), the 
probability of unsatisfied demand will not exceed the critical level of 14%.  
This example demonstrates the importance of setting reliability requirements not only to 
provide a stochastic separation and minimise the probability of unsatisfied demand below a 
maximum acceptable level but also to provide an optimal balance between risk and cost. 
The problem of stochastic separation appears frequently in critical situations. Consider an 
example of emergency demands for a medical specialist arriving from patients in a critical 
state requiring immediate medical attention (e.g. demands from patients with toxic 
poisoning), In this case the obtained hazard rate envelope can be used to determine the 
maximum number of such patients that could be seen by a single medical specialist so that 
the probability of unattended emergency demands remains below a maximum acceptable 
level. The consequences of an unattended emergency demand can be fatal and to keep the 
risk low, the tolerable probability of unsatisfied demand should be very low. 
If the average number density of the demands from a single patient in a critical state is 0 , 
the total number density of the demands characterising all n critical patients is 0  n . 
Determining the maximum acceptable demand rate *  which guarantees with a specified 
probability that there will be no patient demand while the medical specialist is servicing 
another patient can be determined by using a method similar to the method illustrated in 
Figure 9. Dividing the maximum acceptable demand rate *  to 0  yields the maximum 
acceptable number *n  of patients that can be seen by a single medical specialist: 
0
** /n                                                            (10) 
Equation (9) is relevant to a wide class of reliability and risk problems. It can also be 
applied to determine the probability of clustering of two or more flaws in fibres or wires, 
within a critical distance s, given that the flaw number density is  . It is assumed that the 
locations of the flaws follow a homogeneous Poisson process in the finite length L. Solving 
Equation (9) with respect to the flaw number density   defines an upper bound for the flaw 
number density which guarantees with a specified minimum probability a space separation (no 
clustering) of flaws within a small critical distance s. This is important in cases where the 
probability of failure during loading is strongly correlated with the probability of clustering of 
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flaws. Solving equation (9) with respect to the flaw number density   in fact specifies 
requirements regarding the maximum acceptable flaw content in the material in order to 
provide stochastic separation and reduce the probability of failure caused by the clustering of 
flaws. 
 
5.2 Deterministic time separation by scheduling 
Separation in time is required by processes, objects, entities whose simultaneous presence is 
associated with increased risk of failure. A common example of time separation of risk-
critical factors is the traffic lights, preventing collision between intersecting flows of traffic 
and flows of pedestrians. 
The time separation by scheduling enforces consistent time spacing between hazardous 
events. The time separation is used in air traffic control, where it enforces consistent time 
spacing between arriving aircrafts, on the basis of real-time information about the weather, 
headwinds, altitude and speed. The time separation guarantees a sufficient runway approach 
capacity which keeps the risk of accidents low.  
Time separation based on scheduling can be used to create a process combining 
conflicting requirements. During welding operations for example, the voltage must be high in 
order to initiate the welding arc and low in order to produce a fault-free weld. These 
conflicting requirements can be attained by time separation where a very short period of high 
voltage is followed by a longer period of low voltage. In this way, the conflicting 
requirements are satisfied. 
Time separation can be done by changing a process from a non-periodic to a periodic. In 
this way, two incompatible risk-critical factors can be introduced simultaneously by 
transforming their action from continuous to periodic and inserting the action of one of the 
factors in the pauses of the other factor.  
 
5.3 Time and space separation by using interlocks 
Preventing the simultaneous occurrence of two events can be done by using interlock devices. 
Consider a device working in forward and reverse mode (Fig.10a). The simultaneous pressing 
of the forward (F) push-button and reverse (R) push-button causes failure of the operated 
electro-mechanical device and must be prevented. The time separation can be easily done by 
two normally closed contacts f and r. The normally closed contact f opens when the forward 
push-button F is activated (Fig.10b) while the normally closed contact r opens when reverse 
push-button R is activated (Fig.10c). While the forward push button is activated, the normally 
closed contact f is open which eliminates the danger of accidentally or deliberately activating 
the reverse push-button R (Fig.10b). Similarly, while the reverse push button R is activated, 
the normally closed contact r is open which eliminates the danger of accidentally or 
deliberately activating the forward push-button F (Fig.10c). The dangerous simultaneous 
occurrence of the two actions has been excluded by a time interlock. 
The space separation can also be based on interlocks. A common example of space 
separation based on interlocks is the railway signalling. It is impossible to display a signal to 
a train to proceed along a particular route unless the route is safe. 
A common example of a space interlock is the presence-sensing safeguard interlocks 
which stop the operation of hazard equipment if a person is detected in a location where 
injury can occur. The presence-sensing system could be based on laser beams, light or infra-
red beams. Beams of light forming a curtain are generated and if any of the beams is blocked 
by a person moving towards the hazard equipment, a control circuit switches off the power to 
the hazard equipment. 
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Figure 10. Time separation based on interlocks 
 
An example of a simple mechanical space separation interlock is the interruption of the 
power supply from removing the protective shield of rotating machinery. As a result, it is 
impossible to operate the machine without positioning first the protective shield in place, 
which reduces the likelihood of injury. 
A more sophisticated version of the mechanical space separation interlock is the trapped-
key interlock. In one of the possible implementations, the access for repair to the hazard 
equipment is through a door operated by a key which is held trapped on the door until the 
door is firmly closed again by operating the key. While opening the door, a switch is operated 
interrupting the power supply. The hazard equipment cannot be re-energized until the door is 
closed and the key released. Releasing the key essentially guarantees that the hazard 
equipment has been made safe. 
 
5.4 Separation based on barriers and interpretation 
Deterministic space separation based on barriers has a wide application. Reliable operation 
often depends on critical properties, events or factors not being present in the same space 
region. Separating people from hazards has always been an important damage-reduction 
measure, if the control over hazards is lost. Separation in space is present in cases where 
processes, objects, entities whose interaction is associated with risk, are physically separated. 
A familiar example of deterministic space separation based on barriers is the isolation of 
intersecting flows of traffic and flows of pedestrians at different levels to eliminate the risk of 
collisions and accidents. Limiting the spread of infection by quarantine measures involving 
isolating infected individuals is another common example of space separation creating a 
passive barrier. Separating hazardous sources (e.g. fuel tanks) at sufficient distances from one 
another avoids the domino-effect of multiple explosions and reduces significantly the amount 
of damage in the case of fire.  
Deterministic space separation based on barriers is often used to separate sources of 
hazards and targets. Deterministic space separation is the essence of the safety practice of 
building residential areas beyond the radius of harmful influence of toxic substances from 
chemical plants, compost production facilities, fuel depots, etc. Separating people from 
hazards is an important damage-reduction measure if the control over hazards is lost. Physical 
barriers provide passive protection against the spread of fire, radiation, toxic substances or 
dangerous operating conditions. A blast wall for example, guards against the effects of a blast 
wave. Increasing the distance between sources of hazards and targets, minimises damage in 
case of an accident. 
Examples of passive barriers are the safeguards protecting workers from flying fragments 
caused by the disintegration of parts rotating at a high speed; the protective shields around 
nuclear reactors or containers with radioactive waste; the fireproof partitioning; the double 
hulls in tankers preventing oil spillage if the integrity of the outer hull is compromised, etc. 
The boundaries introduced by the separation often help reduce the damage escalation and 
the consequences given that failure has occurred. Thus, dividing a pipe into many separate 
sealed segments limits the damage from a propagating crack within a single segment only, 
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which reduces significantly the consequences from failure. Separation of the corridors in a 
building, with fireproof doors is used to delay the spread of fire. 
Separation of different parts of computer networks has clear security benefits. For a 
separated section of a computer network, accessing a computer in one part of the network 
does not automatically give the attacker an easy access to other parts of the network. Such 
network design can significantly slow down the rate at which an attacker moves towards the 
valuable service and provides more opportunities for a successful detection. In addition, 
separating each segment by firewalls makes accessing the valuable service much more 
difficult because numerous security walls must be breached before an access can be gained. 
The result is a reduced likelihood of unauthorised access. 
Deterministic separation can also be achieved through interpretation. Separation by 
interpretation includes acts of interpretation and compliance in order to perform its function. 
Typical examples are the road signs, the reflective studs on the road separating traffic, 
various warnings, cautions, prohibitions, etc. 
The speed limit in a built region for example, separates a hazard (the car) from the target 
(pedestrian, structure) because when interpreted and obeyed, it provides more time for the 
driver to react and avoid an accident. The obeyed speed limit also provides separation from 
severe consequences given that an accident has occurred because the impulse of a car with 
speed below the speed limit is not sufficient to inflict a fatal damage to a pedestrian. The 
separation by interpretation is low-cost, easy to implement but unreliable. 
 
5.5 Logical separation 
Deterministic logical separation is present in cases where it is logically impossible for a 
dangerous operation to occur at a given point in time or at a given space location. 
Deterministic logical separation is also in place if it is logically impossible for two or more 
objects to be in a dangerous proximity at a given location or at a given time. 
In logical separation, no barriers of any kind are set between the different parts of the 
system yet separation is present. The dangerous proximity of hazards and triggers and 
hazards and targets is made to be logically impossible. 
Consider the safety problem related to preventing the hand of an operator from being in 
the cutting area of a guillotine. If the guillotine can be activated only by a simultaneous 
pressure on two separate knobs/handles which engage both hands of the operator, it is 
logically impossible for the operator’s hand to accidentally reside in the cutting area, at any 
time. The operator’s hands have been separated from the cutting area through the logic of the 
guillotine activation. This is an example of a logical separation reducing the risk of an 
accident. 
Suppose that a dangerous action can occur during a measurement of the residual stresses 
on the surface of a specimen, by X-ray equipment (Fig.11). For example, the dangerous 
action can occur if a person appears in Room A and switches on the X-ray control panel while 
the operator is still positioning the specimen under the X-ray head in room B (Fig.11).  
 
 
Figure 11. An example of logical separation 
The dangerous action can be prevented from occurring by a logical separation. The design 
of the X-ray equipment can be made in such a way that the only way to lift the X-ray shield in 
order to position the specimen and the only way to operate the X-ray control panel in room A 
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is by using the same unique key. Switching on the X-ray control panel and adjusting the 
specimen under the X-ray shield would then require that the same object (the key) to be in 
two different places, at the same time, which is impossible. The safety risk has been 
eliminated by a logical separation. 
Logical separation leads to low-cost yet very efficient designs eliminating safety risks. It is a 
simple yet underutilized generic tool for improving safety and reducing risk. 
 
5.6 Separation in geometry 
Separation in geometry is present when different parts of an object or assembly have different 
geometry to provide optimal conditions maximizing reliability and minimizing the risk of 
failure. A common example of separation in geometry is shaping concave one of the contact 
objects in order to reduce the contact stress and the likelihood of failure.  
Separation in geometry can be used to improve the load resistance of designs, for a specified 
volume of material. 
Consider the cantilever beam with length L and uniform rectangular cross section with 
thickness t and width b (Fig.12a) which has been overloaded by a force with magnitude P. 
Suppose that the tensile strength of the material is s . According to the theory of elasticity, 
the maximum tensile stress t  acting on the beam, is at the cantilever support and is given by 
2
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Consequently, the maximum magnitude of the overloading force which the beam ‘a’ (in 
Fig.12a) can sustain is  
L
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Suppose that the beam has been tapered in the way shown in Fig.12b, such that the right end 
of the beam has thickness t5.0  and the left end has thickness t5.1 . If the width b and the 
length L of the initial beam remain unchanged, the volume of material 
tLbbL
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used for beam ‘b’ will be equal to the volume of material 
tLbVa   used for beam ‘a’. The maximum overload stress which beam ‘b’ can sustain is now 
2.25 times bigger than the maximum overload stress characterising beam ‘a’: 
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The load-carrying capacity of the beam has been increased and the risk of failure has been 
reduced by a separation in geometry. 
Separation in geometry can, for example, increase the resistance to torsion and bending 
with no increase in the amount of material used. The maximal torque which a circular 
component with radius r and cross-sectional area 2rA   can resist (Fig.12c) is given by 
(Gere and Timoshenko, 1999) 
r
I
T s 00

                                                                      (14) 
where 
2
4
0
r
I

  is the central moment of area of the circular cross section and s  is the shear 
strength of the material. 
Now suppose that by separation in geometry, a hollow circular cross section has been 
created (Fig.12d), with outer radius rr 5.11   and inner radius rr )2/5(0  . The cross 
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sectional area of the new section (Fig.12d) is exactly equal to the cross-sectional area of the 
initial solid circular section (Fig.12c) (  2220
2
1 )2/5()5.1( rrrr 
2r ).  
The maximal torque which the hollow circular component can resist is given by 
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As a result,  
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As a result of the separation in geometry, the maximum torque the component can resist has 
been increased 2.33 times. 
 
Figure 12. Separation in geometry to improve the load-carrying capacity of beams. 
 
5.7  Separation to provide an independent operation and protection against a common 
cause 
Separation can be used for improving reliability and reducing risk by providing an 
independent operation of components. If failure of one component makes the failure of 
another component more likely, the reliability of the system can be improved by making the 
two components operate independently from one another. Consider the operation of two 
devices where the second device is powered from the first device. Failure of the first device 
will cause a loss of power for the second device. The reliability of the system can be 
improved if the power supply to the devices is separated.  
Next, consider a dual control system based on two control modules CM1 and CM2 
controlling an electro-mechanical device M. To cut the cost, the two control modules share 
the same cable (Fig.13).  
The two control channels in Fig.13a  are not independent because failure of the cable 
connecting the electro-mechanical device will cause both control channels to fail which 
entails a loss of control over the electro-mechanical device M. Separating (decoupling) the 
control channels (Fig.13b) ensures the independent operation of the control channels and 
improves the reliability of the system. Failure of any of the connecting cables will not result 
in a loss of control over the electro-mechanical device M. 
 
Figure 13. Improving the reliability of a control system by decoupling and ensuring independent operation 
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Decoupling of circuits is usually done by a decoupling capacitor and is often used in 
electronics when a portion of a circuit is prevented from being affected by fluctuations of the 
power supply due to switching occurring in another portion of the circuit.  
Separation to block a common cause is present when a component or a group of 
components are distanced (insulated) from the action of a common cause, simultaneously 
affecting the performance of the components. 
A common-cause failure is usually due to a single cause with multiple failure effects which 
are not consequences from one another (Billinton and Allan, 1992). A common cause reduces 
the reliability of a number of components simultaneously. The affected components are then 
more likely to fail, which reduces the overall system reliability. 
Typical conditions promoting common cause failures are: common design faults, common 
manufacturing faults, common installation and assembly faults, common maintenance faults, 
shared environmental stresses by several components: for example high temperature, 
pressure, humidity, erosion, corrosion, vibration, radiation, dust, electromagnetic radiation, 
impacts and shocks. Common cause may also be due to: a common power supply, common 
communication channels, a common piece of software, etc. Thus, two programmable devices 
produced by different manufacturers, assembled and installed by different people can still 
suffer a common cause if the same faulty piece of software code has been installed in the 
devices. 
Failure to account for common causes usually leads to optimistic reliability predictions - 
the actual reliability is smaller than the predicted. In many cases, the separation method helps 
in blocking out common causes thereby reducing the risk of failure. Separating the 
components at distances greater than the radius of influence of a common cause is an 
efficient way of reducing the risks of common-cause failures. Thus, separating large fuel 
containers at safe distances from one another prevents cascading explosions initiated by the 
explosion of one of the containers. Separating two or more communication centres at 
distances greater than the radius of destruction of a missile, increases the probability of 
survival of at least one of the centres. Multiple back-ups of the same vital piece of 
information kept in different places protects against the loss of information in case of fire, 
theft or sabotage. 
Another implementation of this principle is the separation of vital components from a 
component whose failure could inflict damage. A typical example is separating the control 
lines at safe distances from the aeroplane jet engines. In case of engine explosion, the flight 
controls will still be operational which permits safe landing of the plane. Separating 
redundant components by insulating them from contact with an environment characterised by 
excessive dust, humidity, heath or vibrations, is also an efficient way of protecting against a 
common cause failure. 
Providing maintenance of redundant components by separate operators reduces the 
likelihood of common cause failure due to faulty maintenance. Separating the physical 
principles on which redundant devices operate, provides diversity in design and is a very 
efficient way of blocking out a common cause and reducing common cause failures. The idea 
is to prevent several components from being affected by the same common cause. If two 
pumps (a main pump and an emergency pump) participate in cooling of a chemical reactor, 
failure of both pumps will create an emergency situation. If the two cooling devices are from 
separate manufactures or operate on separate physical principles, the common cause faults 
will be blocked out. For redundant cooling devices, if one of them is powered by electricity 
and the other uses natural gravitation to operate, the common cause “absence of power 
supply” will be blocked out. If, in addition, the two cooling devices are serviced/maintained 
by separate operators, the common cause ‘faulty maintenance’ will also be blocked out. 
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Similarly, a common cause due to an incorrect calibration of measuring instruments can be 
avoided if the calibration is done by separate operators. If finally, the cooling devices are 
separated in different rooms, the common cause failure due to fire will also be blocked out. 
A common cause failure due to a software bug for example, can be avoided if a separate 
algorithm and implementation are provided for the same task or if a separate team is involved 
in developing the same piece of software, independently. 
Separating investment in unrelated sectors protects against a common cause reducing 
simultaneously the return from all sectors (e.g. agricultural sectors simultaneously affected by 
bad weather or disease, consumer sectors simultaneously affected by a health scare, 
investments in different sectors in a country affected by a political crisis, economic crisis, 
social unrest, etc. 
It needs to be pointed out that judgement needs to be exerted in applying the method of 
separation. The act of separation cannot automatically guarantee that a risk reduction will 
always be achieved. In some cases, the antipode of separation - the unification achieves the 
risk reduction. In cases where the separate components performing separate functions are 
lightly loaded, unifying the components into a single component performing all functions 
often achieves the risk reduction, because of reducing the complexity of the system. 
Unification can often eliminate a failure mode thereby reducing the risk of failure. Thus, 
testing the corrosion resistance of specimens made of different alloys could be done by 
shaping the test specimens into reservoirs which hold the corrosive agent. This is an act of 
unification because the specimen now performs two functions: (i) test specimen and (ii) a 
reservoir for the corrosive agent. By the act of unification, the need for a reservoir to hold all 
test specimens is avoided and with it, the failure mode ‘corrosion of the reservoir holding the 
specimens’ is also avoided. Making contacting parts of materials with similar chemical 
composition (unification of properties) often eliminates harmful electrochemical corrosion. 
Unifying the thermal expansion properties of different contacting parts by selecting materials 
with similar thermal expansion coefficients reduces the thermal stresses and thermal fatigue 
and enhances reliability. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Analysis of various separation techniques and the mechanisms through which they 
improve reliability and reduce risk was presented for the first time. A comprehensive 
classification of techniques for improving reliability and reducing risk, based on the method 
of separation was also proposed for the first time. 
 
From the presented classification, three principal categories of separation techniques 
reducing risk have been identified: (i) assuring distinct functions/properties/behaviour for 
distinct components/parts (ii) assuring distinct properties/behaviour at distinct time, value of 
a parameter, conditions or scale and (iii) distancing risk-critical factors. 
 
The concept ‘stochastic separation’ of random events has been introduced. Stochastic 
separation is present if the separation of the risk-critical events is guaranteed with a specified 
probability. A method for providing stochastic separation with a specified probability, 
between random events, was also introduced. 
 
The method of segmentation for reducing risk can be considered as a special case of the 
method of separation where the same function is separated into distinct parts carrying the 
function. 
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The traditional reliability measure ‘safety margin’ is very misleading and must not be used 
to determine the relative separation of the load and strength for non-Gaussian distributions of 
the load and strength.  
 
Separation on a parameter is an efficient technique for reducing risk. The deliberate weak 
links technique and the stress limiters technique are essentially instances of separation on the 
parameter ‘loading stress’. 
 
Separation on properties is an efficient technique for compensating the drawbacks 
associated with a selection based on homogeneous properties. 
 
Introducing deliberate weak links to reduce risk is essentially an application of the method 
of separation.  
 
The logical separation, making it logically impossible for a dangerous operation to occur 
at a given point in time or space, can be an efficient and low-cost risk reduction technique. 
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